I tend to think that the feeling of what it is like to have a phenomenal conscious experience is real but that qualia are not a necessary condition for that to obtain.
Here's a short-ish form of the explanation for eliminativism about qualia from my philosophical perspective:
1. I am a physicalist, and a reductionist most of the time.
2. Qualia are supposed to evince awareness of the likely truth of Chalmers' hard problem, and that of the explanatory gap argument for anti-physicalism. (Neither of which I endorse).
3. To do this, qualia must exist as part of the ontological furniture of the world, or be an existing thing on the menu of existing things, or be in the set of real and existing things, yet be ineffable and not be physical.
4. According to eliminativism about qualia, qualia are not real - they are not part of the furniture of the world or in that menu or set - and are not necessary to explain what it feels like to have a conscious phenomenal experience.
Philosophers who believe (4) usually have physicalistic theories of mind and cognition. I call mine informational identity theory (not to be confused with the integrated information theory of Koch and Tononi.) (https://brucerlong.xyz/blog/b9N2Ms0EPYt37kpWUtzB) . It has an information-processing emphasis, but I am a strange physical reductionist about information in something like the way that James Ladyman and Don Ross are physicalist about frequentist probabilities, which gets a little complicated. (For example: for some reason some people think of structure as only being something mathematical and non-physical, which I find to be an odd - and wrongheaded - Platonic kind of view.)
Why am I talking about mind and cognition? Because I am not a panpsychist and I think that the physical, information processing brain-mind and cognition are necessary (and probably sufficient) conditions for consciousness.
I used a capital 'Q' on qualia in my original reply as an unconventional way of signalling that I am rejecting big 'Q' qualia - the really realist variety - rather than weaker small 'q' deflationist qualia which could be nominalist or illusionist, for example. (Nobody does this thing with the q case. I just did it then. People do, however, do illusionism and nominalism about qualia.)
('Deflationism' is only a good term to use in this context if it's about the fecundity of the ontology.)
