People who believe demons are hunting people are nuts. This fact is not plausibly debatable on any coherent scientific grounds that medical science must adhere to. Such people are as mentally disordered as people who believe that goblins, or unicorns, or any other kind of fictional character are hunting them. This is not plausibly, scientifically, coherently deniable. Not only that — but at this point in history with the scientific knowledge available to us it is beyond obvious that it is not plausibly scientifically deniable. Any psychiatrist saying otherwise on any basis needs to find a new career. Psychiatry is 100% medical hard science, and no diagnosis or case identification should ever happen on any other basis.
In a recent interaction with another professional academic philosopher — and professed atheist and anti-theism activist — on Medium I again wrestled with the problem of our disordered culture and the religious schizophrenia pandemic (Grafman et al., 2020; Wesselmann & Graziano, 2010; Wibisono et al., 2019; Zhong et al., 2017). The philosopher is an atheist and an atheist activist at that, and they spill a lot of photonic ink online attacking belief in God and theistic cults like Christianity.
Much of my own thinking and ethos matches theirs.
However, they then defend the idea that adults with imaginary all-powerful personal friends and paranoid delusions about demons are somehow not mentally disordered? (Or at least they try to defend the practice of modern psychiatry in making this serious misattribution.) This is a mistake and incoherent because it is unambiguously not plausibly deniable that such people are mentally ill according to psychological science. Anyone that says otherwise based on handwaving about philosophical wiggle room or cultural psychiatry is either confused, insane, or having a piece of you.
That goes for psychiatrists too.
Why this anti-scientific and anti-scientistic inconsistency when they clearly cannot possibly coherently, rationally, and plausibly adhere to both viewpoints — that god and demons are not real but that people who believe demons are hunting us are sane? While it is true that people commonly have cognitive dissonance and conflicting ideas this case is different, and philosophers must acknowledge distinctions that matter. In the case where one knows that there is no such thing as goblins, unicorns, Satans, demons (or omniscient gods who want to be friends with people and hate pork and liberated women), one cannot coherently say that people who believe such things are mentally well.
Goblins? Harpies? Poltergeists? The undead?
Faeries? Elves? Dragons?
Demons?
Really? Demons are the same, and everyone with a rational, reasoning mind knows this. They have every bit as much chance of being real as do goblins, faeries, and poltergeists. That’s not nearly enough chance to make anyone who thinks any of those fictions are chasing them sane. Not even close. If your psychiatrist starts talking about demons as if demons are real, then report them immediately and get a new psychiatrist.
It’s not just about the total, complete, undeniable, dearth and absence of scientific evidence for anything supernatural of any kind in the information age when the entire Western world is crammed full of armies of scientific researchers in scientific labs, research teams, and organisations who all have the ability to test for supernatural entities and their effects. There’s no substance-dualistic way around this — because as soon as anything is connected causally to the physical world it becomes subject to detection and testing. If it causes physical effects or patterns of effects in the real world — which it necessarily would have to do to influence the actions and environment of any physical being like humans — then it is immediately subject to scientific experimental investigations and detection by any one of thousands of methods and mechanisms available to science for sensing and detection of effects across the entire electromagnetic spectrum and in all kinds of matter (down to the scale of quantum systems).
It’s also because — as I just mentioned: this is the information age.
Since people often — embarrassingly — don’t get the implications, I will spell it out.
The moment someone found or witnessed anything remotely like a goblin, unicorn, poltergeist, faerie or demon someone would upload that from their smartphone to the internet and everyone in the Western world would see it within the next 7 days, with several million people seeing it in the first couple of hours.
In the information age our entire lives are networked at the speed of light and every city, town, highway — and most national parks — are crammed to the tree-tops with sensors, cameras, weather monitors, more cameras, traffic monitors, security cameras, research cameras.
But that’s clearly not even the main issue. Because any epistemically rational person knows that demons, faeries, and goblins are the same in terms of nature, evidence, existence, and fictional status. Even before the onset of the information age — only crazy adults believed in actual goblins and unicorns and only crazy people believed goblins were after them and threatening anyone who didn’t believe in their imaginary friend. Demons are absolutely the same in every way that matters. Demons are zero percent different in any way that matters. They’re characters from fictions and myths just like the ghosts, goblins, unicorns, and poltergeists. More importantly this is plainly obvious to any rational person.
Based on the powerful principle of inference to the best explanation and epistemic rationality, the best explanation — the only explanation — for people who believe sincerely in entities like goblins, faeries, and demons is psychological. More specifically — the explanation is psychopathology. I have covered the basis of this kind of psychopathology numerously elsewhere, but in the interests of thoroughness here is a brief refresher list of contributing factors to delusional disorder of the kind that evidently comes comorbid with religious schizophrenia:
Maladaptive terror management
Terror management is used by people for facing mortality and self-esteem problems. Some people cannot cope with the fact of their impending deaths and the annihilation that accompanies death and so they deploy maladaptive strategies to manage personal terror. Such maladaptive strategies frequently involve the narratives of abusive cults like Christianity and Islam (Finch et al., 2016; Friedman & Rholes, 2008; Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Vail et al., 2010). The same goes for protecting their damaged self esteem due to their lack of success, lack of talent, and lack of ability to compete with smarter, more talented persons.
Maladaptive goal appraisal
Lazarus’ goal appraisal theory is about how people handle and respond emotionally and behaviourally to thwarted personal goals (Eysenck, 1985; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Less cognitive capacity, education, and resources make a person more vulnerable to maladaptive and predominantly emotional responses to thwarted personal and life goals. Self-delusion and the deployment of ready-to-hand fantastical abusive cult narratives are two common approaches (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996).
The person feels bad because they are a failure and a substandard performer who has no demonstrable talent, and so they make up and gravitate towards memetic narratives that make them feel better by avoiding that reality. They didn’t fail because they’re unlucky and didn’t have what it takes to succeed, or were lazy, or whatever. They failed because some omnipotent god of the universe made it happen for some higher purpose. This of course meshes with maladaptive terror management for self-esteem.
Maladaptive Operant Conditioning for Reward
It’s easier for failed, talentless, normie cultists to substitute fake rewards based on nothing real to attain a dopamine hit than to face the reality of their usually fairly dismal and uninspiring situation. This is one of the main ways in which cult-leader frauds manipulate such people, who are desperate for dopamine.
The social camaraderie and recognition of merit where there is no real merit whatsoever gives the patient an artificial dopamine hit or ‘dopamine cookie’. This is maladaptive to begin with, but becomes steadily and progressively more maladaptive as the person substitutes deeper and more deranged delusional ideation about imaginary achievement and success based on supernatural fictions for actual success based on real performance, talent, and merit.
It also convolves into the tendency to socially aggress and abuse (a sociopathic externalising behavioural symptom) by applying the deranged narratives of the cult to others inside and outside of the cult. The entire world must be subjected to their idiotic, delusional, ridiculous, vacuous, infantile narratives for them to sustain their self-delusion. This and a lack of epistemic rationality combined with group-reinforcement of the delusions contributes further to their anti-social behaviour and also to the following problem — lack of insight(Brambilla & Butz, 2013; Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015; Stephan & Stephan, 2017).
Lack of Insight
Lack of insight, or lack of awareness, is a clinical psychiatric and psychological term that means that the patient has limited-to-no personal awareness of their own delusional and deranged state. They’re unaware that they’re sick, and the content of their delusions and the maladaptive application of those delusions contributes to exacerbating that sickness. They’re caught in a vicious feedback loop of delusional ideation in the service of maladaptive terror management and maladaptive operant-conditioned reward.
They desperately need those dopamine cookies, and so reality left the building a long time ago. The lights are on, but reality is not home. This is the point at which religious schizophrenia and delusional disorder are unquestionably present. Any adult with an imaginary omniscient (how convenient if you’re an ignorant normie!) friend and comorbid paranoid delusions about demons, no less, is unambiguously mentally unwell according to science. This is not even remotely within the ballpark of plausible deniability and claims to the contrary are not only to be treated with great scepticism, but are frankly patently fraudulent.
Maladaptive Emotion-Driven Problem Solving
Smarter or more cognitively capable people tend to deploy cognitive problem solving in the face of thwarted goals and difficult or intractable problems. Less smart people tend to instantly deploy more emotion-driven problem solving which can involve self-delusion and harmful emotional and psychological dysfunction.
Psychological Abuse During Formative Psychosocial Development (Early Maladaptive Schemas)
Adults exposed at a young age to mental patients who believe in demons and other kinds of theist cultists are going to be deeply intrinsically deranged in their ideation and split from reality on the basis of what is essentially psychological abuse by misinformation, ignorance, and manipulation.
I normally don’t stoop to coarse street vernacular in my actual articles (unless someone is being a sociopathic bully or a narcissist’s flying monkey and openly, snidely denigrating me — in which case to hell with that asshole and any turkey or sociopath they rode in on.) However, if you’re an atheist — or anyone else for that matter — who claims or asserts that adults who insist demons are hunting you are sane, mentally well adults: wake up and smell the science. You’re being a bloody idiot. Even your chosen pragmatism doesn’t get you out of sounding idiotic.
If a patient comes to a psychiatrist and starts talking about being threatened and in peril from the bogeyman, goblins, Medusa, ghosts, the undead, or demons, then it is that psychiatrist’s job and responsibility to apply the appropriate evidence-based case identification, diagnosis, and treatment regimens to that obviously very delusional and mentally unwell patient (Miyazono, 2015, 2018).
It is not within their ambit, purview, nor medical scientific valid repertoire of diagnostic tools to start handwaving about philosophy and cultural narratives (First, 2013). In fact, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, and cultural psychology/psychiatry all point to the fact that if the patient is ignoring basic rational cultural narratives like the freely and widely available scientific narratives that make everything from smart phones to MRIs a reality, then the patient is suffering a mental illness.
Mental illness and the nature of mental illness are defined according to various models that cohere with the biopsychosocial model of psychology (Davies & Roache, 2017; Frances, 2014). One of the most influential models is the harmful dysfunction model (Miyazono, 2015). A model that I am researching and have proposed is the maladaptive information processing model. Both models entail that anyone who believes that goblins, unicorns, poltergeists, or demons are hunting them and others — and that anyone who doesn’t obey the whims of their imaginary friend will be unprotected — is clearly suffering a mental illness according to the harmful dysfunction model.
At minimum, the harmful dysfunction involved is a complete inability to appropriately process and vet damaging misinformation that will make the person vulnerable to fraudsters and charlatans. That’s just the beginning of the harm. It also means that they’re vulnerable to abuse by cults with such split-from-reality and misinformational narratives.
Cults like Islam which are built upon infidelophobic and misogynist misinformation about the inferiority of women, for example. Cults like Christianity with its bizarre and highly socially and otherwise inappropriate obsession with controlling the sexuality and sexual choices and behaviour of other people and asserting — bizarrely — that demons are influencing other people’s choices. The degree of narcissistic entitlement and lack of personal boundaries necessary to motivate these behaviours are extreme and extremely pathological.
These are just a couple of the extremely harmful dysfunctions (per the widely accepted psychological theory and model of mental illness) based upon misinformation and maladaptive misinformation processing (per my own closely aligned information theory-based theory) involved in such delusional disorder with comorbid paranoid schizophrenic delusions. They’re plainly pathological and sociopathological according to every relevant and coherent dimensional diagnostic criteria known to psychological science (First, 2013).
Trying to claim otherwise is not only daft, but embarrassingly un-medical-scientific.
And yet our (presumably kabbalistic and/or Freemasonic) opponent insists that psychiatrists don’t ascribe mental illness to people who come to them talking about actual demons because of philosophical wiggle room:
Are Religionists and Capitalists Mentally Disordered?
Some awkward situations for psychiatrists
Philosophy has nothing to do with the diagnostic criteria. Psychiatrists can be interested in philosophy. They can even have as many philosophies as they like. However, psychiatrists are there to do psychiatry. Not theology. Not philosophy.
The question of whether an adult with an imaginary omnipotent (how convenient for those dopamine cookies!) friend and comorbid paranoid delusions about demons is mentally unwell is not a philosophical, ideological, nor even cultural question. It is a medical scientific question that reduces to the fact of harmful dysfunction around maladaptive information processing that leads to anti-social behaviour and to delusional disorder and the state of being split from reality.
Psychiatrists are there to do hard medical science.
Any patient that starts talking about goblins with full doxastic and epistemic commitment is to be committed.
Any patient that starts talking about unicorns, fairies, or elves with full doxastic and epistemic commitment is to be committed.
Any patient that starts talking about demons with full doxastic and epistemic commitment is to be committed.
Saying otherwise is ridiculous and is not plausibly coherent in scientific and epistemically rational terms.
My philosophical opponent’s argument here is that whether adults who believe demons are in the room are mentally disordered depends upon philosophical heuristics and is a philosophical question.
Sorry, but that’s just patently false and cannot be taken seriously on a logical, intuitive, ethical, nor indeed methodological and procedural basis according to what’s supposed to be medical hard science. It’s a scientific question about harmful dysfunction and maladaptive misinformation processing, not a philosophical question based upon prevailing disordered culture.
He argues thus because although he is an outspoken atheist he is (I believe) a kabbalist who errantly equates classifying adults with imaginary friends as mentally disordered with some kind of anti-social intolerance. This is of course wrongheaded. It is anti-social to promote and protect such misinformation.
That the only argument he can come up with is that the definition of mental disorder in relation to adults believing in demons is a philosophical question is telling. Psychiatrists don’t validly get to make a philosophical decision here.
Moreover, it demonstrates clearly that those claiming to be atheists and to be reasoning and scientifically astute cannot afford to deny that adults who believe in demons are mentally disordered. Atheists who do claim that such adults are mentally well are being unambiguously incoherent and unscientific.
According to cultural psychiatry and cultural psychology cultural sensitivity and awareness is important. Of course this is true. But it does not follow that adults who believe in demons are mentally well. It just doesn’t. It can’t.
Cultural Psychology requires people to recognise the importance of prevailing cultural narratives. However, the most important overarching cultural narratives that we have now are all scientific and in the information age there is no excuse for anyone to deny them. It necessarily takes cultural disorder and mental disorder for adults to believe demons are real according to all salient subdisciplines of psychology including cultural psychology and social psychology. Essentially according to the best psychological science if you’re calling an adult who thinks there are demons in the room mentally well then something is very wrong with your reasoning and your scientific coherence and capabilities and that’s simply not coherently, plausibly deniable.
The bottom line here is that you cannot coherently scientifically say an adult who believes in causal demons is any more mentally well than an adult who believes in the real-world influence of faeries, goblins or unicorns. Whoever believes in those things is necessarily mentally ill. This is not plausibly deniable. It is a hard scientific fact of medical science.
Anyone who asserts otherwise and claims to be being scientific or scientifically astute has just reduced themselves to an absurdism. They have made of themselves a standing reductio ad absurdum. Either that or they’re mentally disturbed. This is also not plausibly scientifically, logically, sensibly, or epistemically rationally deniable.
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